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In June of 1996, a three-judge federal court issued a decision in
ACLU v. Reno' holding that the Communications Decency Act,
barring indecency on the Internet, was unconstitutional. Although all
three judges concurred in the result, each rendering separate opinions
containing some fascinating discussion of the correct analogy to apply
to the Internet, there is virtually no agreement: one judge never
discusses the issue;2 one thinks the Internet could be comparable with
either the telephone system or print;3 and the third compares the
Internet both to a printing press4 and to a "worldwide conversation. '
Without judicial constraint and adherence to overarching
principles of free speech, courts are likely to create a crazy quilt of
First Amendment jurisprudence pertaining to the Internet, driven by
the emotions and contingencies of the moment. The best proof of this
danger is the patchwork of laws that the courts have already created
where other electronic media are concerned. Laws pertaining to radio,
television, cable, and the telephone are inconsistent and also contradict
some basic First Amendment values.
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1. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
2. Judge Buckwalter, in a passing comment, slightly touched on the differences in regulating
various mediums of communications. "Prior cases have established that government regulations
to prevent access by minors to speech protected for adults, even in media considered the vanguard
of our First Amendment protections, like print, may withstand a constitutional challenge." Id.
at 859. Even if Judge Buckwalter didn't attempt to categorize the Internet, at least he agrees that
print holds a special or "vanguard" position within the Constitution.
3. Id. at 852.
4. Id. at 878.
5. Id. at 883.
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The Supreme Court will bring the highest degree of clarity to the
Internet freedom of speech debate if, in ACL U v. Reno, it sets forth
the operative metaphor for freedom of speech and applies the metaphor
in conjunction with an appropriate analogy for the technology.6
Part I of this Article discusses judicial decision-making tools with
an emphasis on the use of analogy and the importance of applying legal
precedents in a manner which is consistent and logical. Part I also
discusses the use of metaphor in judicial decisionmaking and illustrates
how operative metaphors for free speech have served to provide judges
with guiding principles in applying the law. Part II of this Article
discusses the use of analogical reasoning in cases involving technologi-
cal media of communications. It points out that where courts do not
analogize new technology to old, they fail in their decisionmaking
capacity and therefore create confusing precedent. This Part concludes
that, in determining the proper First Amendment treatment of new
technologies, courts must apply the operative freedom of speech
metaphor as well as determine the correct analogy for the technology.
Part III of this Article examines the patchwork of laws which exist in
First Amendment cases pertaining to technological media. This Part
will explain the use of terms such as "spectrum scarcity" and "perva-
siveness" which courts have used to rationalize different levels of
governmental intrusion into speech. Part III will also look at the case
of Denver Area Educational Technological Consortium v. FCC' and
argue that it is an illustration of the confusion that is created when
courts fail to find technological analogies in free speech cases.
Part IV of this Article addresses how courts can best understand
the Internet. It lists metaphors which have developed for the Internet
and explains how they can be considered by courts to help understand
the technology from a user's perspective. Finally, this Part concludes
that the Internet is most similar to the printing press for free speech
purposes. By recognizing the Internet as similar to the printing press,
the courts should feel compelled to permit the least amount of
governmental intrusion into content.
6. This Article concentrates on the proper analogy for the Internet. However, we also
believe (as does Ithiel Pool, infra note 15) that the printing press is the correct analogy for all
communications media.
Editor's note: On June 26, 1997, just prior to publication of this Article, the Supreme Court
ruled onACLU v. Reno, holding that the "indecent transmission" and "patently offensive display"
provisions of the Communications Decency Act were unconstitutional infringements on freedom
of speech. The opinion can be found at 1997 WL 348012 (1997).
7. 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
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I. JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING TOOLS
A. Analogy and Adherence to Precedent
In his lectures on the judicial process, Judge Benjamin Cardozo
seven decades ago acknowledged that a judge does not find law in the
same way that a scientist discovers a law of nature.8 Judges make law,
much as a legislator does, and in so doing, they must search history for
rulings on similar subject matter:
I do not mean that the directive force of history, even when its
claims are most assertive, confines the law of the future to unin-
spired repetition of the law of the present and the past. I mean
simply that history, in illuminating the past, illuminates the present,
and in illuminating the present, illuminates the future.9
And he quoted Maitland: "'Today we study the day before
yesterday, in order that yesterday may not paralyze today, and today
may not paralyze tomorrow."' 10
Cardozo urged that judges begin by first asking what the subject
matter resembles:
The first thing he does is to compare the case before him with the
precedents, whether stored in his mind or hidden in the books. I do
not mean that precedents are ultimate sources of the law, supplying
the sole equipment that is needed for the legal armory, the sole
tools, to borrow Maitland's phrase, "in the legal smithy." Back of
precedents are the basic juridical conceptions which are the
postulates of judicial reasoning, and further back are the habits of
life, the institutions of society, in which those conceptions had their
origin, and which, by a process of interaction, they have modified
in turn."
Once the precedents have been collected and sorted so as to "separate
the accidental and the non-essential from the essential and inherent,"
there is much more to the work.'2 The judge must effectively apply
precedent to the contemporary state of facts before her, selecting from,
or blending, the following approaches:
8. See generally BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
9. Id. at 53.
10. Id. at 54 (quoting FREDERIC MAITLAND, COLLECTED WORKS VOLUME III 438
(H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911)).
11. CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 19.
12. Id. at 30.
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The directive force of a principle may be exerted along the lines of
logical progression; this I call the rule of analogy or the method of
philosophy; along the line of historical development; this I will call
the method of evolution; along the line of the customs of the
community; this I will call the method of tradition; along the lines
of justice, morals and social welfare, the mores of the day; and this
I will call the method of sociology.13
Each of Cardozo's pathways stresses the importance of adhering
to precedent in resolving the issue at hand. The path which leads
there most directly is what he calls "the rule of analogy." Analogy is
a "logic[al] ... inference that certain admitted resemblances imply
probable further similarity."14 In cases dealing with a new medium,
analogical reasoning involves the selection of a model from prior media.
This is the thought process which, for example, led courts in the
nineteenth century to recognize that the telephone was effectively like
the telegraph.15
The other three methods provide alternative routes to the same
result. The method of history involves reviewing history in search of
similar things and events, any of which may become the analogy if
logic confirms its applicability. The third method, custom, is similar
to history: one might call custom a subset of the precedent you find
in history. Finally, the sociological method, as Cardozo explains it,
involves determining the "social value" of a proposed ruling,16 or
rather, its fairness and consistency with contemporary mores.
Of Cardozo's four pathways, the sociological method relies least
on analogy to reach a result. Nevertheless, a result which determines
the social value of the ruling may be best cemented with a good
analogy. After all, a well-reasoned ruling may be of little continuing
value if courts fail to recognize it as a precedent in a future case where
it would otherwise have provided guidance. Analogies can therefore
13. Id. at 30-31.
14. WEBSTER's NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 64 (1975).
15. See ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 100 (1983). Cass Sunstein
notes approvingly that analogical reasoning
does not require people to develop full theories to account for their convictions; it
promotes moral evolution over time; it fits uniquely well with a system based on
principles of stare decisis; and it allows people who diverge on abstract principles to
converge on particular outcomes.... A notable aspect of analogical thinking is that
people engaged in this type of reasoning are peculiarly alert to the inconsistent or
abhorrent
Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 790-91 (1993).
16. CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 73.
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serve as the thread connecting a sociological result to future controver-
sies.
Because of its lack of adherence to precedent, Cardozo notes that
the sociological method may only be freely used within the gaps left by
prior rulings:
We must not throw to the winds the advantages of consistency and
uniformity to do justice in the instance. We must keep within those
interstitial limits which precedent and custom and the long and
silent and almost indefinable practice of other judges through the
centuries of the common law have set to judge-made innovations.
But within the limits thus set, within the range over which choice
moves, the final principle of selection for judges, as for legislators,
is one of fitness to an end.' 7
Cardozo also quotes Saleilles: "'The goal is the internal life, the
hidden but fruitful soul, of all law ..... Ultimately, the judicial
process involves "search and comparison, and little else."1 9 The law
which results "is not found, but made.""0  Cardozo sums up by
saying:
My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this, and little
more: logic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted
standards of right conduct, are the forces which singly or in
combination shape the progress of the law.2'
The judicial process, as Cardozo describes it, is similar to the
taxonomy pioneered by Cuvier: compare a new animal to familiar
animals to determine the one to which it is most similar. Then analyze
the differences.22 The judicial process even has its echo in modem
object-oriented software analysis, where the analyst names classes of
objects and creates a hierarchy of "inheritance" based on their
relationships to one another.23 Adjudication, to put it simply, is no
more than another form of human work; like all others, it benefits from
a careful use of analogical reading.
17. Id. at 103.
18. Id. (quoting RAYMOND SALEILLES, ON JURIDICAL PERSONALITY 497 (1911)
(translation by Jonathan Wallace)).
19. CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 163.
20. Id. at 115.
21. Id. at 112.
22. See generally GEORGES CUVIER, THE ANIMAL KINGDOM, ARRANGED IN CONFORMI-
TY WITH ITS ORGANIZATION (Kier B. Sterling, ed., Ayer Co. Pub. 1978).
23. See generally PETER COlAD & ED YOURDON, OBJECT ORIENTED ANALYSIS (1991).
1997]
Seattle University Law Review
B. Use of Metaphor
A metaphor is "a figure of speech in which one thing is likened
to another, different thing by being spoken of as if it were that other.
. 24 It is a profoundly important concept for freedom of speech in
general because it creates consistency and gives direction to policy,
legislation, and adjudication.2"
The importance of analogy and adherence to precedent in the
judicial process is demonstrated by a host of authors who have
developed metaphors for the judicial process. For example, constitu-
tional scholar Ronald Dworkin has suggested a chain novel to describe
the process, where judges are the authors who each write a chapter of
the story.26 The idea of a "chain novel" is marvelously tactile. The
character who was cruel and selfish in chapter one may, through
personal growth caused by hard experience, become compassionate in
chapter ten; but he should not sprout wings and fly. The "chain
novel" metaphor is perfectly consistent with Cardozo's view of the
constraints judges must respect in their decisionmaking role. Dwor-
kin's chain novel metaphor brings to life Cardozo's theory and
illustrates it in a manner which is both accessible and entertaining.
Michael Kammen, in his metaphorically-titled book on the
Constitution, A Machine That Would Go of Itself,27 discusses shifting
metaphors for our Constitution:
The most common way of referring to the Constitution-the oldest
as well as the most enduring-is simply as an "instrument," often
preceded by such modifiers as "written," "practical," "sacred" and"wonderful" .....
During the second half of the nineteenth century another
metaphor came into vogue, more vivid than instrument but also
more ephemeral: the analogy to an anchor .... It recurred from
time to time during the next half century, but essentially was
supplanted by two others that gained even wider currency .....
The first of these, the notion of a constitution as some sort of
machine or engine, had its origins in Newtonian science....
24. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1132 (1975).
25. While the line between metaphor and analogy is not precise, Sunstein states that
metaphors are comparisons, while analogies are more literal. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 748
n.26.
26. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 10 (1996).
27. MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF 16-19 (1986).
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[After 1888], a cultural transition took place that leads us to
the last of the major constitutional metaphors. We may exemplify
it with brief extracts from three prominent justices: Holmes, who
wrote in 1914 that "the provisions of the Constitution are not
mathematical formulas ... they are organic, living institutions";
Cardozo, who observed in 1925 that "a Constitution has an organic
life"; and Frankfurter, who declared in 1952 that "The Constitution
is an organism. "28
The power of metaphors for the Constitution has increased over
time and has greatly impacted decisionmaking. For example, if the
policy question on the table is "How frequently should we amend the
Constitution?" each metaphor could give a different answer to the
question. With Kammen's first metaphor, an instrument is merely
amended, which is easy to do and unproblematic. With the second,
an anchor is modified, which is almost as easy and is unlikely to
interfere with its efficiency. With the third, a machine is redesigned,
which may be somewhat more laborious than changing an anchor and
may possibly break it, or at least cause it to run less efficiently.
However, with the last metaphor, an organism is subjected to radical
surgery-something that should almost never be done except in a great
emergency.
The operative metaphor for freedom of speech in the United
States was created by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing in 1919,
in the following famous words:
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas
.* *[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market . . ..
Courts since then, when in need of a metaphor for freedom of
speech, have usually reached for Holmes's "marketplace of ideas."
Courts' adherence to Holmes's phrase illustrates the important benefits
of a strong metaphor. Once courts decide that free speech is a
marketplace of ideas, many questions are answered. Under First
Amendment jurisprudence, when judges ask themselves "Under what
circumstances should speech be prevented from entering the market-
place?" they immediately consider the circumstances under which they
would enjoin the distribution of a product. A strong American interest
in the freedom of commerce dictates that a product will not be banned
28. Id. at 16-19 (citing Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914) (Holmes quote);
Browne v. City of New York, 149 N.E. 211, 214 (N.Y. 1925) (Cardozo quote); Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 518 (1952) (Frankfurter quote)).
29. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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merely because judges do not approve of it. Thus, the choice of a
metaphor immediately provides insight to resolve disputes relating to
the subject matter.
Similarly, a court may be concerned with the ultimate fate of good
speech and bad speech: Will the former be drowned out while the
latter triumphs? The marketplace of ideas metaphor, founded on
optimism, reassures us that good speech will triumph because it is the
better product. Once again, the metaphor guides us rapidly to the
right philosophical and sociological answer to our question.30
Not all metaphors are equal. A bad metaphor can, of course, lead
to bad decisionmaking. Cass Sunstein believes that the "marketplace
of ideas" metaphor has literally turned the freedom of speech into a
degraded form of commerce. He characterizes the "system of free
expression in America" as a "system of unregulated private markets,"
similar to "cars, brushes, cereal and soap." In this system, an
individual could only be heard by persuading a newspaper or broadcast
station to allow it, unless she was wealthy enough to purchase the
space. Free speech is a "commodity in a free market economy" with
economic value and protected by antitrust law.3
Sunstein explicitly blames Justice Holmes for the cheapened
commercial conception of free speech:
Holmes' opinion builds strong protection for speech on two founda-
tions: skepticism about prevailing understandings of truth and the
metaphor of "competition in the market." Truth itself is defined by
reference to what emerges through "free trade in ideas." For
Holmes, it seems to have no deeper status. The competition of the
market is the governing conception of free speech. On his view,
politics itself is a market, like any other.32
Sunstein prefers a "town meeting" concept of freedom of speech,
in which the First Amendment is intended to solely protect democratic
30. I have always been among those who believed that the greatest freedom of speech
was the greatest safety, because if a man is a fool, the best thing to do is to encourage
him to advertise the fact by speaking. It cannot be so easily discovered if you allow him
to remain silent and look wise, but if you let him speak, the secret is out and the world
knows that he is a fool. So it is by the exposure of folly that it is defeated; not by the
seclusion of folly, and in this free air of free speech men get into that sort of
communication with one another which constitutes the basis of all common achieve-
ment.
See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 546 n.1 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (quoting Woodrow
Wilson, Address at the Institute of France (May 10, 1919), in SELECTED LITERARY AND
POLITICAL PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF WOODROW WILSON 333 (1926)).
31. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 17-18 (1993).
32. Id. at 25.
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deliberation, and not degraded matters such as advertising or pornogra-
phy. The importance, according to Sunstein, is to encourage debate
among varying cultures. Further, people should be "open to the force
of argument" in an effort to "give up their initial views when shown
the general benefit of the whole community." This, he concludes, will
produce better public decisions because "there is a great deal of
empirical evidence that deliberation can have a transformative function
on beliefs."33
Again, the choice of the metaphor can determine the outcome.
Sunstein, contrary to the opinions of First Amendment analysts
supporting the marketplace of ideas metaphor, believes that govern-
ment should intervene in speech where necessary to promote democrat-
ic deliberation. For example, you cannot run an efficient town meeting
if people are waving pornography. He calls our lack of substantive
discussion on public issues and diversity of views in decisionmaking a
"Madisonian failure" and argues that, in some cases, government
intrusion can "actually improve free speech processes."
' 4
Steven H. Shiffrin proposes a different approach. He wants our
symbol of freedom of speech to be the romantic dissenter, an Emerson,
Whitman or Thoreau:
If the first amendment is to have an organizing symbol, let it be an
Emersonion symbol, let it be the image of the dissenter. A major
purpose of the first amendment, I will claim, is to protect the
romantics-those who would break out of classical forms: the
dissenters, the unorthodox, the outcasts. The First Amendment's
purpose and function in the American polity is not merely to protect
negative liberty, but also affirmatively to sponsor the individualism,
the rebelliousness, the anti-authoritarianism, the spirit of nonconfor-
mity within us all. 35
Shiffrin's dissenter is an appealing figure, but it cannot function
as a metaphor for freedom of speech. It can be said that the American
system of freedom of expression is a marketplace or a "town hall," but
not that it is a dissenter. The dissenter stands at one remove, a symbol
of the individual the First Amendment is intended to protect, not a
symbol of the system itself. Nevertheless, the dissenter as a symbol
also serves the purpose of helping to determine outcomes. In
answering a question like, "may we ban demonstrations in public
33. Id. at 241-43.
34. Id. at 251.
35. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRsT AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ROMANCE 5
(1990).
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parks?" the metaphor pointing out the need to protect dissent provides
more guidance than the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to recommend an appropriate
metaphor for the freedom of speech itself. Instead, these examples are
given to illustrate the importance of metaphor to free speech determi-
nations. In what follows, it is assumed that the "marketplace of ideas"
is the prevailing metaphor, as it is the one that the Supreme Court has
chosen in those cases in which a metaphor is mentioned at all.
II. USE OF ANALOGICAL REASONING IN
TECHNOLOGICAL CASES
Analogical reasoning plays a profoundly important role whenever
a court must decide the proper legal rules to apply to a new technolo-
gy. Sadly, however, courts usually stumble before they find the correct
analogy for new technologies. The law of copyright has provided
several notorious examples. Piano rolls were not originally understood
to be analogous to sheet music.3 6  Software stored in read only
memory was not understood to be the same as software stored on
disk."
Communications scholar Ithiel de Sola Pool published his
remarkable Technologies of Freedom in 1983.38 Subtitled "Of Free
Speech in an Electronic Age," the book forecasts many of the dangers
and disputes that we are encountering fourteen years later in determin-
ing which rules to apply to electronic media. Following Cardozo's
injunction to study the past for its applicability to the future, Pool
gives an incomparable historical account of the legal confusion
surrounding the introduction of telegraphy and the telephone:
Courts like to treat new phenomena by analogy to old ones. When
the telephone was invented, the question was whether, at law, the
telephone was a new kind of telegraph or something different. If the
phone was a telegraph, a body of law already existed that would
apply. The decisions sometimes went one way, sometimes the
other; but the model of the telegraph was always there to be
considered."
Pool cites a classic Supreme Court failure of imagination. In
1899, the Supreme Court denied telephone companies use of the public
36. See White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Composers, 209 U.S. 1, 10 (1908).
37. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 813 (E.D.
Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd. Cir. 1983).
38. POOL, supra note 15.
39. Id. at 100.
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right of way for their wires, which had been granted to telegraph
companies by the 1866 Post Roads Act:
[G]overnmental communications to all distant points are almost all,
if not all, in writing. The useful Government privileges which
formed an important element in the legislation would be entirely
inapplicable to telephone lines, by which oral communications only
are transmitted.4"
When a court fails to use analogical reasoning and attempts to
regulate a new technology without the guidance of history, it risks
creating bad law. Although such determinations are almost always
eroded over time or reversed later, they may cause harm in the
intervening years. When determining First Amendment applicability
to new technologies, a court must consider not only the technology
itself, but also principles of free speech. Determinations as to the
proper First Amendment treatment of new technologies should be
influenced by the operative freedom of speech metaphor as well as the
correct analogy for the technology.
An example of the early use of analogy is Primrose v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., ' in which the Court faced the question of
whether a telegraph company could refuse to transmit a telegram based
on its content. Prior to the Primrose decision, telegraph companies
sometimes provided their own journalistic wire service and refused to
carry dispatches from reporters to their newspapers, viewing these as
competition."
In 1866, Congress included in the Post Roads Act43 a require-
ment that telegraph companies provide service, to all customers
without discrimination like a common carrier. The Supreme Court
agreed and held that "[tielegraph companies resemble railroad
companies and other common carriers, in that they are instruments of
commerce' 44 and therefore, must provide services without discrimina-
tion. The Court selected the railroad as the appropriate analogy for
the telegraph and determined that services must be similarly provid-
ed.45
40. Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. S. Bell, Tel. & Tel. Co., 174 U.S. 761, 776 (1899)).
41. 154 U.S. 1 (1893).
42. POOL, supra note 15, at 92-95.
43. 19 Stat. 319 (1877).
44. POOL, supra note 15, at 95-96 (quoting Primrose, 154 U.S. at 14 (1893)).
45. See also Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 79 N.W. 315,
317 (Minn. 1899) ("The rule is well established that in applying the principles of the common
law or in construing statutes the telephone is to be considered a telegraph .. "); Hudson River
Tel. Co. v. Watervliet Turnpike & Ry Co., 32 N.E. 148, 149 (N.Y. 1892) (applying statutes
1997]
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Selection of an operative metaphor for freedom of speech to be
used in conjunction with the telegraph analogy would have aided the
Court in deciding this case. Holmes's "marketplace of ideas," for
example, would have supported the conclusion that the telegraph
company's ban on journalistic dispatches was an unfair ban on entry
into the marketplace by a company which enjoyed a public monopoly
or use of the public right of way.46
The danger in technological freedom of speech cases is that courts
tend to regard each new communications technology as sui generis, not
relevant to anything which came before it. Zechariah Chafee, in his
seminal Free Speech in the United States,47 observed that for centuries
newspapers, books, pamphlets and large meetings were the only means
of public discourse, and the need for their protection was obvious.
When new methods of discourse developed, writers and judges were
not versed in protecting freedoms. This led to the "censorship of the
mails, the importation of foreign books, the stage, the motion picture
and the radio. 48
Models for new technology, and analogical reasoning, help us
avoid such sui generis determinations in several ways. A persuasive
analogy is similar to an intuitive rule in that it is simple, appeals to the
imagination, and is easy to apply.49
authorizing telegraph transmission to telephone); Attorney General v. Edison Telephone Co., 6
Q.B.D. 244 (1880) (same); see also Duke v. Central New Jersey Telephone Co., 21 A. 460 (N.J.
1891) (The telephone is a "novel method of accomplishing the object for which telegraphs were
erected .... ); but see, Chicago Telephone Co. v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 120 N.E. 795,
799 (II1. 1918) (Carter, J., dissenting) ("Telegraph companies are as distinct from telephone
companies as a railroad company is distinct from a steamboat company.").
46. Holmes, of course, described the marketplace of ideas in the Abrams decision some
twenty-six years after the Court decided Primrose.
47. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941).
48. Id. at 381.
49. Philosopher Peter Singer draws a distinction between "intuitive" and "critical" rules of
ethics. Intuitive rules are simpler, broader, more appealing to the imagination and easier to
remember and apply. See PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 92-93 (1993) (citing R.M. HARE,
MORAL THINKING (1981)). Singer discusses the distinction between critical and intuitive moral
reasoning:
To consider, in theory, the possible circumstances in which one might maximize utility
by secretly killing someone who wants to go on living is to reason at the critical level
... Everyday moral thinking, however, must be more intuitive. In real life we usually
cannot foresee all the complexities of our choices.... Hare suggests, it will be better
if, for our everyday ethical life, we adopt some broad ethical principles and do not
deviate from them.
Id. See also Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 449, 471-72 (1985). Arguing that First Amendment jurisprudence should create rules that
will stand up in pathological times such as the McCarthy era, Blasi notes that courts should
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Since an analogy innately makes a comparison between two things,
it reminds us that the subject matter before us is likely not sui generis
and is probably similar to something else. At the same time, a
metaphor like the "marketplace of ideas" is a useful image for the
values to apply in making the determination. Most importantly, strong
metaphors and logical analogies deter bad outcomes in hard cases,
when more subtle doctrines would be easily overlooked. These judicial
tools "keep[] the starch in the standards for those moments when the
daily politics cries loudest for limiting what may be said."50
III. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE PERTAINING TO
COMMUNICATIONS: A PATCHWORK OF CONFLICTING LAWS
A common complaint of First Amendment law is that it is a
patchwork, devoid of any guiding moral principle. This patchwork has
generated legislative confusion, incongruous decisions and judicial
inefficiency. Each time courts are required to rule on an issue they are
forced to repeat the same work. Although this problem has spawned
a move toward creating a single standard for all communications
media, agreement as to what that standard should be is not likely to be
created soon. Until that time, courts will continue to add discrepant
standards. For example, Shiffrin notes:
First amendment law now is, if nothing else, a complex set of
compromises. Sometimes speech that presents a clear and present
danger is protected; sometimes it is not; sometimes speech is not
protected even though it presents no clear and present danger of any
ordinarily recognizable evil. The Court periodically formulates
exquisitely precise rules; it settles at other times for the most
generally phrased standards; often it opts for hazy formulations and
relies on the lower courts to fill in the details; sometimes the Court
stays its hand and says nothing. The result is a body of law
search for methods of justifying their judgments that appeal to the common,
unsophisticated understanding of what law is.... From the standpoint of influencing
attitudes regarding the desirability of free speech, we might begin the quest for
simplicity by recognizing the valuable role played by some of the simple precepts of the
judicial heritage .... [citing the marketplace of ideas, among others]. [S]imple precepts
can have a strong intuitive appeal, and it is just that kind of emotional force that may
be most effective in reversing or containing the dangerous attitude shifts that take place
in pathological periods.
Id.
50. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n,
116 S. Ct. 2374, 2401 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring).
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complicated enough to inspire comparisons with the Internal
Revenue Code.51
Shiffrin calls First Amendment law a "[c]ommittee product,"
created by "[n]ine independent social engineers," and adds that
committee products are "notoriously schizophrenic. '5 2
Professor Eric M. Freedman adopted a marvelous metaphor to
describe the plight of First Amendment law today:
Current free speech law resembles the Ptolemaic system of astrono-
my in its last days. Just as that theory grew increasingly incoherent
in an attempt to incorporate new empirical observations that were
inconsistent with its basic postulates, so is First Amendment
doctrine disintegrating as cases reviewing restraints on speech strive
to paper over the fact that analyses based on presuppositions as to
the value of particular kinds of expression are inconsistent with the
premises of the First Amendment itself.5 3
For example, in 1915, the Supreme Court held that movies were
not protected expression under the First Amendment because they are"a business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like
other spectacles, not to be regarded .. . as part of the press of this
country, or as organs of public opinion." 4  However, in 1952 the
Court reversed itself on this point, holding that operation for profit has
no effect on whether the freedom of expression should be protected.55
The Court added sensibly that "each method [of communication] tends
to present its own peculiar problems. But the basic principle of
freedom of speech and of the press, like the First Amendment's
command, do not vary."5 6
In Leathers v. Medlock, 7 Justices Marshall & Blackmun ex-
pressed a similar view: "Although cable television transmits informa-
tion by distinctive means, the information service provided by cable
does not differ significantly from information services provided by...
newspapers, magazines, television broadcasters, and radio stations. s8
51. SHIFFRIN, supra note 35, at 2-3.
52. Id. at 3.
53. See Eric M. Freedman, A Lot More Comes Into Focus When You Remove the Lens Cap:
Why Proliferating New Communications Technologies Make It Particularly Urgent for the Supreme
Court to Abandon its Inside-Out Approach to Freedom of Speech and Bring Obscenity, Fighting
Words and Group Libel Within the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 883, 885 (1996).
54. Mutual Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915).
55. Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 502.
56. Id. at 503.
57. 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
58. Id. at 457 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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In other words, to attain consistency of First Amendment outcomes,
the courts and the legislatures should treat the method of storage or
transmission as irrelevant and focus instead on the information itself.
Contrast this, however, with Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC,9 where
the Supreme Court found that "it is able to posit an unbridgeable First
Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every
individual to speak, write or publish."6
A. Spectrum Scarcity and Persuasiveness
A string of broadcast cases from National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States6  through Federal Communications Commission v.
Pacifica Foundation,62 cable cases such as Turner Broadcasting Systems,
Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission63  and Denver Area
Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. Federal Communica-
tions Commission,64 as well as telephone cases such as Sable Communi-
cations v. Federal Communications Commission6' are examples of Shif-
frin's committee-based social engineering. In reading these cases, one
looks in vain for an operative metaphor for free speech. Because of the
lack of a "fruitful soul" in the Supreme Court's electronic media
jurisprudence, these decisions fail to recognize the parallels with prior
media, and instead become caught up in technological details which an
overarching metaphor might subsume.6 6
For example, the doctrine of "spectrum scarcity" allowed
Congress to make rules for broadcast media that would be unconstitu-
tional if applied to print. In National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, the Communications Act of 1934 was upheld by the Court
59. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
60. Id. at 388.
61. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
62. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
63. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
64. 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
65. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
66. The Court's mistake in regulating electronic media has not been in recognizing the
First Amendment interests of viewers and the potential defects in the marketplace of
ideas; rather, it has been in grounding those timeless concerns in the transient nature
of the technologies involved. Early on, the Court seized upon frequency scarcity as a
justification for regulating the electronic media in order to increase viewpoint diversity.
The ensuing debate about the regulation of new communications technologies has too
often focused on a comparison of technologies instead of on the underlying question of
how a regulatory regime can assure that First Amendment values-which involve the
interests of both speakers and listeners--can best be served.
Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107
HARV. L. REv. 1062, 1076-77 (1994).
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because the radio was not available to everyone, or "scarce," which
distinguished it from other modes of expression.6 7
The Court could have reached a different result either by
analogizing the radio to the telephone or by applying the generic"marketplace of ideas" metaphor. For the first, broadcasters, rather
than providing their own content, might have been treated as common
carriers like the telephone or telegraph companies, forced to lease
bandwidth to any customer requesting it.6" For the second, instead
of being given away free to licensees, the rights to broadcast on the
various available frequencies might have been divided up and sold to
the highest bidder. This would have created an incentive to the owner
to sublicense or resell smaller parts or time slots of spectrum that
would, in the long run, have been fairer and created a more diverse
dialog on the airwaves than that which exists today.69 Either ap-
proach would have resulted in a more permissive application of free
speech principles, and accordingly would have allowed for less
restrictions on speech.
Due to the lack of an anchoring metaphor and failure to analogize
consistently, the technical distinction of spectrum scarcity was soon
forgotten and new bases for government intervention were identified.
Later, the censorship originally justified on scarcity grounds was
applied to other, nonscarce electronic media.
For example, in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica
Foundation, a case which Pool called a "legal time bomb" because it"could be used to justify quite radical censorship,"7 the Court
identified an alternative excuse for censorship: the "pervasiveness"
doctrine. Pacifica, known as the "Seven Dirty Words" case, involved
an afternoon broadcast on public radio of comedian George Carlin's
monologue about the seven words "you cannot say on the air."71 The
Court upheld the Federal Communications Commission's sanction of
the station but neglected to mention spectrum scarcity as the founda-
tion of broadcast regulation. Instead, it referred to the "uniquely
pervasive presence" of broadcasting to justify the sanction. Conserva-
tive groups have since leaped on "pervasiveness" as an important
source of government authority to censor the Internet, arguing
67. Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 226.
68. POOL, supra note IS, at 136.
69. Id. at 138.
70. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748; POOL, supra note 15, at 134.
71. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 751-55.
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forcefully in Congress and the courts that it can be regulated because,
though not scarce, it is "pervasive. ' 72
Persuasiveness is both a misleading and dangerous argument for
regulation of indecent Internet content. It is misleading because of
what almost everyone concedes is a compelling government interest in
protecting children from sexual material. 3 Yet it is dangerous
because it still does not provide any substantive basis for distinguishing
between electronic media and print. A child is just as likely, if not
more likely, to stumble upon indecent content by flipping through a
copy of Playboy found in the bottom of a closet, discover a copy of
National Geographic in the library, or indeed, to find a rape or
dismemberment scene in the Old Testament 74 as he is to find similar
content on the Internet. The Bible may reasonably be called "perva-
sive" in the sense that it is probably still found in more American
households than are television sets.
Likewise, there is no "spectrum scarcity" argument in the
telephone cases. In fact, in the last century the telephone company was
declared a common carrier which could not intervene in the content of
its customers' speech. 7' Then, in the 1980s, Congress passed
legislation regulating telephone "dial-a-porn." The Court upheld the
72. See generally 142 CONG. REC. HI 145, H1175 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (comments of
Rep. Goodlatte).
73. The ACLU, however, does not concede this point. During the ACLU v. Reno trial,
it introduced as a witness sex expert Dr. Slayton, who testified that his five year old son had
watched videos of oral sex without incurring any harm.
Q And these films that you've been talking about that do have the explicit depictions
of sexual activity, you believe that it would be-that it would not be harmful to show
those to minors, right?
A No, right.
Q And so you believe it would be appropriate to show those films-or would not be
harmful to show those films to a 12-year-old.
A Right, or if a 12-year-old saw them. I don't think it would do harm.
Q And it would be all right -
A I don't think I would take 12-year-olds to a show, in fact, it's against the law. I
wouldn't do it.
Q But you think it would do no harm if they did see it?
A Absolutely it wouldn't.
Q And you think it would be appropriate for a 10-year-old to see those films?
A Yeah. My five-year-old saw them, when he was five years old.
Cross Examination of Dr. William R. Stayton By Ms. Russotto, ACLU v. Reno (No. 96-963-M)
(United Stated District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania March 21, 1996). Also
available at <http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/trial/trial.htm>.
74. See, e.g., Judges 19:22, 29. For a collection of violent and sexual excerpts from the
Bible, see, Tanith Tyrr, The Indecent Bible (visited June 12, 1997) <http://www.spectacle.org/
cda/bible.html>.
75. POOL, supra note 16, at 100-01.
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"reverse blocking" of telephone indecency in Sable Communications v.
FCC.76 The Court failed to reveal the legal source of its ability to
regulate the content of telephone speech. It held that the government
had a compelling state interest in protecting children from indecent
speech and that the legislation was narrowly tailored because adults
could still obtain "dial-a-por" if they wished. No one has yet
explained why the same constitutional test, applied to print, could not
be used to justify the banning of Catcher in the Rye from bookstores
or libraries and forcing adults to send for it by mail.77
There is also no argument of spectrum scarcity in cable television
cases, as cable does not travel over the airwaves and the number of
channels that can be brought into the home is limited only by the ever-
increasing bandwidth of the cable itself. Nevertheless, the Court has
declined the invitation to hold cable as free as the press or to hold
cable as restricted as broadcast. The Court has not elucidated the
bizarre treatment of cable as a fluctuating hybrid, nor has it explained
why the FCC has any influence over it. The results of the hybrid are
often untenable. For example, cable stations are prohibited from
carrying shows available in the same marketplace via broadcast
stations, while at the same time they can be compelled to carry the
local broadcast stations under the "must-carry" rules.78
Rationales proffered by the Court for government intervention in
cable originally included that cable is "ancillary to" television; that it
competes with television; and that some cable channels are broadcast
via the airwaves to the local facility that sends them over the cable into
peoples' homes.7 9 In Turner v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion,s° a "must carry" case, the Court gave some indication that it
might be preparing to free cable from television-style restrictions when
it finally distinguished cable television from the broadcast medium."1
76. 492 U.S. at 118 ("reverse blocking" involves providing access to a service only if a
customer requests it, typically in writing).
77. However, note the argument of Congressman Goodlatte (R. Va.) in support of the
CDA, on the day that it deared Congress in its final version.
Some have even claimed that an indecency standard will keep great literary works such
as "Catcher in the Rye" off the Internet. I strongly disagree.... The context of the
material cannot be disregarded when making a determination of indecency. Therefore,
if someone transmits the entire novel "Catcher in the Rye" they would not be violating
an indecency standard, but if they transmit only certain passages out of context they
might.
142 CONG. REC. at 1175.
78. Turner, 512 U.S. at 666.
79. See Pool, supra note 15, at 160-66.
80. 512 U.S. at 666 (1994).
81. Id. at 639.
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B. Denver Area Educational Telecommunications v. FCC
In Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v.
Federal Communications Commission, 2 Pool's ticking time bomb
finally exploded. In Denver, the Court considered federal legislation
affirming a cable provider's right to ban indecency on leased access
channels; 3 requiring the "reverse blocking" of indecent content if not
banned;8 4 and allowing the provider to block indecent content on
public access channels.8" The Court upheld the first provision and
held the other two unconstitutional.
Before Denver, many believed that the Pacifica court had not
intended "pervasiveness" to be meaningful in the absence of "scarcity."
But in Denver, four justices explicitly endorsed "pervasiveness" as a
rationale to justify government intervention in speech, even if spectrum
scarcity was inapplicable to the medium in question. Denver, decided
in June of 1996, is the ultimate example of the First Amendment
doctrinal drift: it is a confusing, fragmented decision, without a
majority opinion. The decision, though somewhat contradictory,
substantively tilts in favor of freedom of expression. Procedurally,
however, it achieves its goals via a dangerous pathway because of the
plurality's failure to analogize. Justice Breyer, writing on behalf of
three other justices, complained:
Like the petitioners, Justices Kennedy and Thomas would have us
decide this case simply by transferring and applying literally,
categorical standards this Court has developed in other contexts.
For Justice Kennedy, leased access channels are like a common
carrier. ... For Justice Thomas, the case is simple because the
cable operator who owns the system over which access channels are
broadcast, like a bookstore owner with respect to what it displays on
the shelves, has a predominant First Amendment interest.. . . Both
categorical approaches suffer from the same flaws: they import law
developed in very different contexts into a new and changing
environment, and they lack the flexibility necessary to allow
government to respond to very serious practical problems without
82. 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
83. Id. at 2380. Cable providers are required to set aside a certain number of channels to
lease to other content providers.
84. Id. at 2381.
85. Id. at 2380. Most municipalities, in granting cable franchises, require providers to set
aside one or more channels for noncommercial programming provided by nonprofit and individual
members of the public.
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sacrificing the free exchange of ideas the First Amendment is
designed to protect."
Justice Breyer's opinion says that "rigid" judicial formulae will act
as a "straight jacket" which "disables government from responding to
serious problems":
[N]o definitive choice among competing analogies (broadcast,
common carrier, bookstore) allows us to declare a rigid single
standard, good for now and for all future media and purposes....
[A]ware as we are of the changes taking place in the law, the
technology, and the industrial structure, related to telecommunica-
tions.... we believe it unwise and unnecessary to pick one analogy
or one definitive set of words now.87
Applying a "balancing" approach and citing Pacifica's "pervasive-
ness" doctrine approvingly, the plurality held that granting cable
providers the right to ban indecent programming on leased channels
partly restored their prior right to select programming."8 On the
other hand, "reverse blocking" requirements were onerous and
expensive. Finally, the right to interfere in public access programming
violated the discretion of local municipalities, which might view the
content differently than the cable provider.
Justice Souter, who joined in the plurality opinion, also wrote a
concurrence. He agrees with Justice Kennedy that a strict categorical
approach "keeps the starch in the standards for those moments when
the daily politics cries loudest for limiting what may be said." 9 He
therefore felt it necessary to explain why he joined the Court's
unwillingness to prescribe a category. He explained that the cable
industry, like the rest of the telecommunications industry, is in a state
of flux, and the possibility looms that the separate electronic media will
converge. Rules for one medium which ignore the potential effects on
others would soon be antiquated.90
Noting that it is likely that media will "become less categorical
and more protean,"91 Justice Souter concludes that the proper
doctrinal category is not yet clear. 92 With a strange pride, Justice
Souter points out that it took fifty years for the clear and present
86. Id. at 2384.
87. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2385.
88. Id. at 2398. Prior to the passage of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act, cable providers had no obligation to lease channels to other content distributors.
89. Id. at 2401 (Souter, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 2402.
91. Id.
92. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2402.
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danger test in Schenk v. United States93 to evolve into the modern
incitement rule of Brandenburg v. Ohio.94 Finally, with misplaced
confidence, he quotes from the Hippocratic oath: "First, do no
harm."9'  He is apparently unaware of the serious harm potentially
inflicted on the freedom of speech by the plurality's endorsement of"pervasiveness" and its refusal to establish the correct analogy.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissenting in part,
recognizes that "the plurality opinion ... is adrift."96
The opinion treats concepts such as public forum, broadcaster, and
common carrier as mere labels rather than as categories with settled
legal significance; it applies no standard, and by this omission loses
sight of existing First Amendment doctrine. When confronted with
a threat to free speech in the context of an emerging technology, we
ought to have the discipline to analyze the case by reference to
existing elaborations of constant First Amendment principles.97
He concludes that adherence to standards "even when it means
affording protection to speech unpopular or distasteful, is the central
achievement of our First Amendment jurisprudence."98 The use of
analogy is "a responsibility," rather than the "luxury" that the plurality
considers it to be.99
Another troubling aspect of the plurality's approach is its suggestion
that Congress has more leeway than usual to enact restrictions on
speech when emerging technologies are concerned, because we are
unsure what standard should be used to assess them. Justice Souter
recommends to the Court the precept, "'First, do no harm'....
The question, though, is whether the harm is in sustaining the law
or striking it down. If the plurality is concerned about technology's
direction, it ought to begin by allowing speech, not suppressingit.100
Justice Kennedy is correct. The approach followed by the
plurality would have been shocking to Justice Cardozo because the
plurality is saying that history is unclear, the method of analogy is too
confusing, we are uncertain about applicable customs, and social values
give uncertain guidance. Therefore, rather than pursuing these
93. 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919).
94. 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
95. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2402.
96. Id. at 2404 (Kennedy, J., concurring, dissenting in part).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2406.
99. Id. at 2407.
100. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2407.
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analyses, we'll just balance the interests and hope we did the right
thing.
When a ship loses its anchor, it may drift away, or it may drift
back over you. As Congress legislates, and the Court upholds, broader
exceptions to the freedom of speech, the question becomes why print
should even be exempt. In Tornillo v. Miami Herald,'0 ' professor
Jerome Barron, who had written articles calling for broadcast treatment
of the press, asked the Court to apply the FCC's "fairness doctrine"
to newspapers."°2 Barron wanted to force the Miami Herald to
publish a reply to an editorial it had printed about his client. The
Supreme Court refused to take the bait, though Barron persuasively
argued that newspapers have monopoly power.103
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNET: How BEST TO
DETERMINE THE APPLICABILITY OF FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLES
The dispute over regulation of indecent speech on the Internet,
culminating in the ACLU v. Reno decision, is a battle between two
analogies, broadcast and the printing press. The statute at issue, the
Communications Decency Act (CDA),' ° amalgamated broadcast
language from the Communications Act of 193405 and more recent
FCC regulations"0 6 to fashion a regulatory scheme for the Internet.
Supporters of the CDA argued that, though the Internet might lack
scarcity, it was pervasive as required by the Court in Pacifica, and
therefore its content was subject to government regulation. The
ACLU and other free speech proponents argued that the Internet, like
the printing press, should be free of any regulation of content.
A. The Use of Metaphor to Understand the Technology
Emerging technologies have relied on metaphor to explain their
uses. Metaphor allows us to understand new modes of communication
by offering us vivid images of the technology's power and utility.
101. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
102. Id. at 247.
103. Id. at 252. See also LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 94-95 (1991).
Bollinger, playing devil's advocate, argues that newspapers may not be more restricted than
broadcast stations, as a community usually has one newspaper but several radio and television
stations, and there are roughly 1,700 daily newspapers in the country and 13,000 broadcast
stations. Becoming very devilish indeed, he concludes that "it is reasonably arguable that broadcast
regulation may well be the relevant analogy for print." Id. at 95. See also 142 CONG. REC. at
1175.
104. 47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 560-561 (1997).
105. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
106. See generally 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.4170, 76.701 (1997).
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Marshall McLuhan may be called the patron saint of communications
metaphor. In addition to his famous description of television as "the
global village,"'11 7 he also called the telegraph "the social hor-
mone"108 and radio "the tribal drum. ' °9
In fact, the instrumentality by which we access the Internet-the
computer-utilizes an interface based on metaphors. You click on a
garbage can icon to delete a file, drag an image to drop it into your
text, and open an in-box to read your mail. The computer screen
simulates a desktop. Calling the Internet the "Net" is itself a
metaphor, as are the phrases "cyberspace" (the network simulates
geographical space) and the "information superhighway" (which makes
the geographical metaphor more concrete by describing the kind of
physical space the system emulates-a highway). The Internet is an
exciting new medium, and writings about it by journalists, sociologists,
and users overflow with metaphor.
William Mitchell, in the metaphorically-titled City of Bits,"'
says:
The network is the urban site before us, an invitation to design and
construct the City of Bits (capital of the twenty-first century), just
as, so long ago, a narrow peninsula beside the Maeander became the
place for Miletos. But this new settlement will turn classical
categories inside out and will reconstruct the discourse in which
architects have engaged from classical times until now.
This will be a city unrooted to any definite spot on the surface
of the earth, shaped by connectivity and bandwidth constraints
rather than by accessibility and land values, largely asynchronous in
its operation, and inhabited by disembodied and fragmented subjects
who exist as collections of aliases and agents. Its places will be
constructed virtually by software instead of physically from stones
and timbers, and they will be connected by logical linkages rather
than by doors, passageways and streets. 1 '
Other authors choose metaphors for the computer based on
human communities and interactions. Howard Rheingold, in the
metaphorically-titled The Virtual Community,"2 said:
107. MARSHALL McLuHAN, THE GLOBAL VILLAGE: TRANSFORMATIONS IN WORLD
LIFE AND MEDIA IN THE 21ST CENTURY (1989).
108. MARSHALL McLuHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA 248-49 (1995).
109. Id. at 302.
110. WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, CITY OF BITS (1995).
111. Id. at 24.
112. HOwARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY (1993).
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There's always another mind there. It's like . . . the comer bar,
complete with old buddies and delightful newcomers and new tools
waiting to take home and fresh graffiti and letters ... It's a
place." 3
For Allucquere Rosanne Stone, the operative metaphor is the
computer as a human prosthesis, and the most resonant image is her
two year old daughter merged with a computer:
In the image a two-year-old sits at an ancient 8086 done, her tiny
hands on the keyboard, a huge grin on her face. The screen radiates
a brilliant yellow glow that illuminates her face and arms. Suffused
with that electronic glow, her face almost seems to be taking on an
illumination of its own. She seems to evince a generous permeabili-
ty, an electronic porosity that is pathognomic of the close of the
mechanical age... and as I glance up at the image I can see the
machine doing it too, as they both hover on the brink of collapsing
into each other. This implosion is her moment. 4
Sherry Turkle sees the Internet as a personal movie:
[I]t is computer screens where we project ourselves into our own
dramas, dramas in which we are producer, director and star. Some
of these dramas are private, but increasingly we are able to draw in
other people. Computer screens are the new location for our
fantasies, both erotic and intellectual."'
Although these metaphors were not conceived by lawyers and are
not dedicated to legal outcomes, they have profound significance for
Cardozo's "sociological method" of judicial analysis. One cannot
regulate a medium of expression, any more than one can a medium of
commerce such as the stock exchange or the international letter of
credit system, without first understanding what it means to its users
and what they derive from it. Cardozo comments:
The triers of the facts. . . must consult the habits of life, the
everyday beliefs and practices, of the men and women about them.
Innumerable, also, are the cases where the course of dealing to be
followed is defined by the customs, or, more properly speaking, the
usages of a particular trade or market or profession .... Life casts
the moulds of conduct, which will some day become fixed as law.
113. Id. at 24.
114. ALLUCQUERE ROSANNE STONE, THE WAR OF DESIRE AND TECHNOLOGY AT THE
CLOSE OF THE MECHANICAL AGE 166 (1995).
115. SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN 26 (1995).
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Law preserves the moulds, which have taken form and shape fromlife. 16
Cardozo recommends that, where there is a conflict, the judge
should typically apply the mores of the community in question, not his
own:
Let us suppose, for illustration, a judge who looked upon theatre-
going as a sin. Would he be doing right if, in a field where the rule
of law was still unsettled, he permitted this conviction, though
known to be in conflict with the dominant standard of right
conduct, to govern his decision? My own notion is that he would
be under a duty to conform to the accepted standards of the
community, the mores of the times.'17
Before creating a rule for the Internet, a judge ought to consult,
among others, Rheingold, Mitchell, Stone and Turkle, in order to
understand the custom and usage of the Internet. The metaphors
which these authors adopt for the Internet communicate a massive
amount of information compressed into a small package, facilitating
efficient analysis.
A striking example of such a consultation occurred at the
Philadelphia trial of ACLU v. Reno, where sociologist Donna Hoffman
of Vanderbilt University testified on behalf of the plaintiffs. Hoffman
explained her theory of "flow": the psychological satisfaction we derive
from the uninterrupted, improvisatory movement of the World Wide
Web."' Technological solutions which require a human action, such
as password screens, or which slow down the network, such as ratings
systems in which your software must check the rating of every screen
it accesses, interrupt the flow. The government's expert, Dr. Olsen,
agreed that even "a minute is [an] unreasonable [delay] . . .[P]eople
will not put up with a minute."" 9  The court combined these
statements in its findings of fact. 120
Nonspontaneous, carefully described metaphors proposed by
lawyers or judges also have an important role in First Amendment
116. CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 63-64.
117. Id. at 108.
118. Testimony of Donna Hoffman in Hearing Before the Honorable Delores K. Sloviter,
ACLU v. Reno (No. 96-963-M) (United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, March 22, 1996) also available at <http://205.177.10.31/ciec/transcripts/
Mar_22_Hoffman.html> (visited Jun. 5, 1997). For an index of articles by Donna Hoffman, see
<http://www2000.ogsm.vanderbilt.edu>.
119. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 846 (ED. Pa 1996).
120. Id. (the findings of fact were based on mutual stipulations agreed upon during pretrial
meetings between the ACLU, the Government, and Judge Dalzell).
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jurisprudence. The successful "marketplace of ideas" metaphor is an
obvious example. While metaphors offered by users inform judges
following the "sociological method" of the boundaries and mores of the
subject matter, legal analogies bind a court's thinking and provide a
flag to be saluted in future cases.
B. Analogizing the Internet for First Amendment Jurisprudence
Legal analogies for the Internet tend to be more restrained than
the users' images of computers as self-created movies or prostheses.
In the field of Internet law and its predecessor, the law applicable to
bulletin board systems (BBSs) and on-line services such as Compu-
Serve and Prodigy, a legal dialog dating back to the mid-1980s, has
produced many analogies to other modes of communications. Lance
Rose summarizes these in his book entitled Netlaw, which contains
sections titled "The Online System as Print Publisher," "The Online
System as Telephone Service," "The Online System as Bookstore," and
(shades of Rheingold) "The Online System as Local Bar."'' Rose's
exegesis in this last section illustrates the utility of a good legal
analogy:
If a bar patron spouts slanderous falsehoods about his boss, its
obvious the words are his, not the bar owner's. If another customer
keeps stolen software under his trench coat and sells it in the back
room outside the bar keep's notice, that activity is the software
seller's alone, and cannot imaginably be blamed on the owner of the
bar.122
Naturally, proponents of Internet regulation have no shortage of
analogies of their own. Besides the broadcast analogy, which is innate
in the CDA itself,123 the rhetoric of CDA supporters is well-repre-
sented by Senator Daniel R. Coats's statement that "[t]he Internet is
like taking a porn shop and putting it in the bedroom of your children
and then saying, 'Do not look.""124  Again, analogies determine
outcomes: If the Internet is a porn shop in a child's bedroom, the only
conceivable reaction of a civilized human being would be to get it out
of there.
Some judges have analogized electronic media to print. A key
precedent from libel law proposes a library or bookstore model for on-
line services that distribute other people's text. In Cubby, Inc. v.
121. See generally LANCE ROSE, NETLAW (1995).
122. Id. at 27.
123. As discussed infra, the language of the CDA is borrowed from broadcast regulations.
124. 141 CONG. REC. S8310, S8333 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (comments of Sen. Coats).
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CompuServe, Inc.,125 the court considered whether to hold Compu-
Serve Information service liable for an alleged defamatory statement
made on-line by a user of the service. The court held:
CompuServe's CIS product is in essence an electronic, for-profit
library that carries a vast number of publications and collects usage
and membership fees from its subscribers in return for access to the
publications.... While CompuServe may decline to carry a given
publication altogether, in reality, once it does decide to carry that
publication, it will have little or no editorial control over that
publication's contents.126
The court concluded that CompuServe had no more control over
the content of the messages and files it carries than a "public library,
book store or newsstand. . ." and that it would be no more feasible for
CompuServe to examine the contents of every file it carries "than it
would be for any other distributor to do so."' 27
However, when Prodigy relied upon Cubby in Stratton Oakmont,
Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,128 to avoid defamation liability, the court
rejected the defense ostensibly because Prodigy was more like a
publisher that makes editorial decisions than a bookstore or library
that merely distributes publications.'29 This was due to Prodigy
"[holding] itself out to the public and its members as controlling the
content of its computer bulletin boards."'3 0 Significantly, both Cubby
125. 776 F. Supp. 135, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
126. Id. at 139 (Computer bulletin board system is analogous to a library or bookstore and
is thus not liable for defamatory material it had no notice it possessed). See also Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). In Stratton,
Judge Ain rejected Prodigy's reliance on Cubby by denying Prodigy's motion for summary
judgment because he considered Prodigy more of a publisher than a bookstore or library due to
Prodigy "[holding] itself out to the public and its members as controlling the content of its
computer bulletin boards." Stratton, 1995 WL at *4. Judge Ain explained that what led him
to distinguish Cubby were statements by Prodigy such as
[wie make no apology for pursuing a value system that reflects the culture of the
millions of American families we aspire to serve. Certainly no responsible newspaper
does less when it chooses the type of advertising it publishes, the letters it prints, the
degree of nudity and unsupported gossip its editors tolerate.
Stratton, 1995 WL at *2. Nevertheless, both courts agree with the underlying premise of this
article, that on-line services are more analogous to a printing press, a bookstore, or a library than
any other communications medium.
127. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1959), which held that a bookstore owner could not
be held liable for the contents of an obscene book of which he was not personally aware.
128. 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
129. Stratton, 1995 WL at *4.
130. Id.
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and Stratton used a print medium as the analogy for on-line servic-
es. 131
Justice Thomas, in his partial dissent in the Denver case, also
opted for print as the appropriate analogy for cable. He argued that
cable providers, like book or magazine editors, should have unfettered
discretion to decide which speech to present to their customers.132
In ACLU v. Reno, Judges Sloviter and Judge Dalzell chose two
different analogies, while Judge Buckwalter never discussed analogy at
all. 33  Chief Judge Sloviter compared the Internet to the telephone
system: "Internet communication, while unique, is more akin to
telephone communication, at issue in Sable, than to broadcasting, at
issue in Pacifica, because, as with the telephone, an Internet user must
act affirmatively and deliberately to retrieve specific information
online."' 34  This apparently means that, according to Sloviter, the
Internet could be regulated as a common carrier, which guarantees
greater protection from restriction than broadcasting, but would still
subject the Internet to more regulation than print.
Judge Sloviter, however, also compared the Internet to print:
When Congress decided that material unsuitable for minors was
available on the Internet, it could have chosen to assist and support
the development of technology that would enable parents, schools,
and libraries to screen such material from their end. It did not do
so, and thus did not follow the example available in the print media
where non-obscene, but indecent and patently offensive books and
magazines abound."'
Judge Dalzell's views are more expansive. He argued that the
Internet is a "new medium of mass communication,"' 36 and that
131. See also It's In The Cards, Inc., v. Fuschetto, 535 N.W.2d 11 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that posting a message to an on-line bulletin board is a "random communication of
computerized messages analogous to posting a written notice on a public bulletin board...").
132. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2421 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("In
Turner, by adopting much of the print paradigm, and by rejecting Red Lion, we adopted with it
a considerable body of precedent that governs the respective First Amendment rights of
competing speakers .... Drawing an analogy to the print media, for example, the author of a
book is protected in writing the book, but has no right to have the book sold in a particular book
store without the store owner's consent. Nor can government force the editor of a collection of
essays to print other essays on the same subject.").
133. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
134. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 851.
135. Id. at 857.
136. Id. at 872.
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First Amendment jurisprudence requires consideration of its special
qualities to determine if the CDA is constitutional.'37
Dalzell recited an impressive list of Supreme Court opinions,
explaining that the "medium-specific approach to mass communication
examines the underlying technology of the communication to find the
proper fit between First Amendment values and competing inter-
ests." '138
Dalzell rejected the notion that the Internet resembles broadcast-
ing. He argued that the Internet is a unique medium for mass
communication and may be protected even more than print because it
overcomes many of the failures of print:
First, the Internet presents very low barriers to entry. Second, these
barriers to entry are identical for both speakers and listeners. Third,
as a result of these low barriers, astoundingly diverse content is
available on the Internet. Fourth, the Internet provides significant
access to all who wish to speak in the medium, and even creates a
relative parity among speakers.'39
137. Id. See also Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("We are
encountering a communications medium unlike any we have ever known.").
138. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 873. Judge Dalzell's amazingly articulate analysis
deserves repeating. "Nearly fifty years ago, Justice Jackson recognized that '[t]he moving picture
screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and the street corner orator have
differing natures, values, abuses and dangers. Each ... is a law unto itself."' Id. (quoting Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)). The Supreme Court has expressed
this sentiment time and again since that date, and differential treatment of the mass media has
become established First Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., Turner 114 S. Ct. at 2456 ("It is true
that our cases have permitted more intrusive regulation of broadcast speakers than of speakers in
other media"); City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Different communications media are treated differently for First
Amendment purposes."); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500 (1981) ("This
Court has often faced the problem of applying the broad principles of the First Amendment to
unique forums of expression"); Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 ("We have long recognized that each
medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems"). Thus, the Supreme Court
has established different rules for print, Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258, broadcast radio and television,
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 400-01, cable television, Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2456-57, and even billboards,
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 501, and drive-in movie theaters, Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 217-18 (1975). This medium-specific approach to mass communication examines the
underlying technology of the communication to find the proper fit between First Amendment
values and competing interests. In print media, for example, the proper fit generally forbids
governmental regulation of content, however minimal. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258. In other
media (billboards, for example) the proper fit may allow for some regulation of both content and
of the underlying technology (such as it is) of the communication. See, e.g., Metromedia, 453 U.S.
at 502. Radio and television broadcasting present the most expansive approach to medium-
specific regulation of mass communication. As a result of the scarcity of band widths on the
electromagnetic spectrum, the Govemment holds broad authority both to parcel out the
frequencies and to prohibit others from speaking on the same frequency.
139. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 877.
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He pointed out that print media, by comparison, accomplish none
of these elements. Restrictions on the Internet will actually "reduce"
it to the level of print media: "In this respect, the Internet would
ultimately come to mirror broadcasting and print, with messages
tailored to a mainstream society from speakers who could be sure that
their message was likely decent in every community in the coun-
try."140 And again, "this change would result in an Internet that
mirrors broadcasting and print, where economic power has become
relatively coterminous with influence."' 41  Earnestly, Dalzell cau-
tioned that "[w]e should also protect the autonomy that such a medium
confers to ordinary people as well as media magnates.' 142
Dalzell, therefore, would put the Internet on a higher pedestal
than print and certainly higher than broadcast. He concluded:
My examination of the special characteristics of Internet communi-
cation, and review of the Supreme Court's medium-specific First
Amendment jurisprudence, lead me to conclude that the Internet
deserves the broadest possible protection from government-imposed,
content-based regulation. If "the First Amendment erects a
virtually insurmountable barrier between government and the print
media, " . . . even though the print medium fails to achieve the
hoped-for diversity in the marketplace of ideas, then that "insur-
mountable barrier" must also exist for a medium that succeeds in
achieving that diversity. If our Constitution prefer[s] "the power of
reason as applied through public discussion,. . . [r]egardless of how
beneficent-sounding the purposes of controlling the press might be,"
... even though "occasionally debate on vital matters will not be
comprehensive and ... all viewpoints may not be expressed," . . .
a medium that does capture comprehensive debate and does allow
for the expression of all viewpoints should receive at least the same
protection from intrusion.143
In determining an analogy for the Internet, Dalzell declared that,
"[t]he Internet is a far more speech-enhancing medium than print, the
village green, or the mails. 144 He concluded:
Cutting through the acronyms and argot that littered the hearing
testimony, the Internet may fairly be regarded as a never-ending
worldwide conversation. The Government may not, through the
140. Id. at 878.
141. Id. at 878-79
142. Id. at 882.
143. Id. at 881 (quoting Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 259-60).
144. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 882.
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CDA, interrupt that conversation. As the most participatory form
of mass speech yet developed, the Internet deserves the highest
protection from governmental intrusion. 4'
Judge Dalzell described the Internet as a "world wide conversa-
tion," realizing that a conversation could take place over a conference
table, over a phone line (including a video conference transmitted via
a phone line or the Internet), through the mail (or e-mail), by typing
a message to another person in an on-line chatroom, or even while
sitting under an old oak tree distributing copies of ideas to discuss with
acquaintances. 146
The First Amendment to the Constitution provides all Americans
with three basic, yet extremely important, protections: freedom of
145. Id. at 883. Dazell further states:
True it is that many find some of the speech on the Internet to be offensive, and amid
the din of cyberspace many hear discordant voices that they regard as indecent. The
absence of governmental regulation of Internet content has unquestionably produced a
kind of chaos, but as one of plaintiffs' experts put it with such resonance at the hearing:
"What achieved success was the very chaos that the Internet is. The strength of the
Internet is that chaos." Just as the strength of the Internet is chaos, so the strength of
our liberty depends upon the chaos and cacophony of the unfettered speech the First
Amendment protects. For these reasons, I without hesitation hold that the CDA is
unconstitutional on its face.
Id. (quoting Testimony of March 22, 1996, at 167).
146. The latter is much like the concept of the "liberty trees" or "town hall" meetings of
colonial America, where individual free thinkers conceived ideas and philosophies, set them to
paper and then met to distribute, discuss and debate them with each other. In fact, the town
meeting, coupled with the rapid growth of the printing press produced the very seed which
spawned this country, our Constitution, and most importantly, the First Amendment.
Again following Boston's lead, virtually every town that conducted protests against the
Stamp Act dedicated a Liberty Tree. Over the years most pre-Revolutionary events
gravitated to the tree: ritualized stampmaster resignations, repeal celebrations,
commemorations of August 14, celebrations of Wilke's election to Parliament, later
protests against customs duties and the Tea Act, intimidation of loyalists, and the
ushering in of independence. The trees were pruned, fitted out with commemorative
plaques, and decorated with lanterns and flags. The pruning was to bring the number
of branches to match such popularly celebrated totals as the ninety-two who voted
against the governor (in support of the legislature's right to circulate a petition to other
colonies). To signal meetings of the Sons of Liberty "they erected a flagstaff, which
went through the tree, and a good deal above the top of the tree." In New York City
and elsewhere Liberty Poles were erected for similar purposes and with similar
ceremony. British soldiers and loyalists responded to the symbolism of the trees and
poles by cutting them down. New York's largest riot, in 1770, erupted as the result of
repeated attacks by British soldiers on the Liberty Pole.
PETER SHAW, AMRICAN PATRIOTS AND THE RITUALS OF REVOLUTION 182 n.12 and 14
(1981) (emphasis added). Indeed, these trees were usually tacked with signs, advertisements,
political doctrines, messages, etc. Pamphlets printed by hand and by printing press, such as The
Federalist Papers, Common Sense and the Declaration of Independence were now able to be
distributed en masse.
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speech, freedom of the press and the right to assemble peacefully. 147
The rationale for guaranteeing one of these rights can usually be
applied to the others. Indeed, "[i]t was not by accident or coincidence
that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single
guaranty with the rights of the people to peaceably assemble. ,148
As the Supreme Court has stated over the years,
Those who won our independence believed . .. [t]hat freedom to
think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them,
discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine; ... and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government.1 49
Further, "'the right of the people peaceably to assemble' . . . along
with religion, speech, and press are preferred rights of the Constitution,
made so by reason of that explicit guarantee . . . ,,o and "the
premise that the right to assemble peaceably ... [is] among the most
precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights. Moreover,
[this right is] . . . intimately connected both in origin and in purpose,
with the other First Amendment rights of free speech and free
press." ' Ultimately, "[n]o one can read the long history which
records the stern and often bloody struggles by which these cardinal
rights were secured, without realizing how necessary it is to preserve
them against any infringement, however slight.' 152
Precious, preferred, indispensable, cardinal. These are the
operative words used by the court in an effort to hold the First
Amendment as one of the most sacred clauses in the Constitution.
Each stirs a certain emotion that confirms the validity of the statement
it surrounds. If each of the rights provided by the First Amendment
is given supreme authority separately, then surely a communications
medium that combines all three should be given special consideration
and deference when determining how much regulation, if any, should
147. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
148. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 530. See also De Jonge v. State of Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364
(1937) ("The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press
and is equally fundamental.").
149. Whitney v. People of State of California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
150. Adderly v. State of Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
151. United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Assoc., 389 U.S. 217,
222 (1967).
152. Associated Press v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 301 U.S. 103, 135 (1937).
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be allowed. Not since the era of the town hall and the printing press
has another form of mass communication so revolutionized public
discourse by providing both speaker and listener with relative parity.
Indeed, the Internet could be analogized to either a virtual
printing press or a virtual town hall. It is a place where people from
many cultures, backgrounds and descents can interact with others with
common threads and attachments. They can type their ideas in a text
file and post it on-line, the equivalent of nailing a newsletter to a tree.
The three judge panel of ACLU v. Reno seemed to agree that,
[The Internet] ... links people, institutions, corporations, business-
es, and governments around the world .... This communications
medium allows any of the literally tens of millions of people with
access to the Internet to exchange information. These communica-
tions can occur almost instantaneously, and can be directed either to
specific individuals, to a broader group of people interested in a
particular subject, or to the world as a whole.'53
The court's findings of fact characterized the Internet as "interac-
tive," where the user becomes both the "listener" and "content
provider." This makes the Internet a "unique and wholly new
medium of worldwide human communication.' '1 4
Interactivity may be the missing link between the Internet and
other mediums. Other than a conversation, there is no completely
interactive medium. One can write a letter to the editor of a newspa-
per, but the newspaper will never print all the letters it receives. One
can call into a radio station, but only a select few callers will be put on
the air. And one may get fifteen minutes of fame on television, but
most of us do not have this opportunity. In contrast, the Internet, as
Dalzell argued, could be considered a worldwide conversation. If the
Internet is restricted, he predicted that many Internet users will either
drop out or censor their information. Therefore, "[s]ince much of the
communication on the Internet is participatory, i.e., is a form of
dialogue, a decrease in the number of speakers, speech fora, and
permissible topics will diminish the worldwide dialogue that is the
strength and signal achievement of the medium."'3 3
The court in Shea v. Reno,156 the sister case to ACLU v. Reno,
agreed.
153. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
154. Id. at 843.
155. Id. at 879.
156. 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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As the growth in Internet use and the wide availability of tools and
resources to those with access to the Internet suggest, the Internet
presents extremely low entry barriers to those who wish to convey
Internet content or gain access to it. In particular, a user wishing
to communicate through e-mail, newsgroups, or Internet Relay Chat
need only have access to a computer with appropriate software and
a connection to the Internet, usually available for a low monthly fee.
The user then in a sense becomes a public "speaker," able to convey
content, at relatively low cost, to users around the world to whom
it may be of interest .... The ease of entry of many speakers sets
interactive computer systems apart from any other more traditional
communications medium that Congress has attempted to regulate in
the past. With one-way media such as radio and television
broadcasting or cable programnning, a user is merely a listener or
viewer; in the CDA, Congress sought to target "interactive"
computer systems through which a listener or viewer, by definition,
has the power to become a speaker. The relative ease of speaker
entry and the relative parity among speakers accounts for the
unprecedented and virtually unlimited opportunities for political
discourse, cultural development, and intellectual activity that
Congress found to characterize emerging communication technolo-
gies.' 57
The idea that a communications medium can be a "public forum"
is not new. For example, in Denver, Justice Kennedy argued that
"[p]ublic access channels meet the definition of a public forum. '158
Although the "most familiar . .. traditional forums [are] ... streets,
sidewalks and parks, which by custom have long been open for public
assembly and discourse, . . [p]ublic forums do not have to be physical
gathering places .. .nor are they limited to property owned by the
government."'5 9 Justice Kennedy argued that "[a] common carriage
mandate .. .serves the same function as a public forum. It ensures
open, nondiscriminatory access to the means of communication....
Once a forum is opened up to some groups for assembly or speaking,
the government may not prohibit other groups from assembling or
speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. ' 16°
157. Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 929-930.
158. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2409 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
159. Id. (citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2516-
17 (1995) ("physical gathering places") and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund,
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) ("government property")).
160. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2412 (quoting Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
96 (1972)).
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Regardless of whether the Internet is compared to broadcast,
cable, common carriage, print or even a "worldwide conversation," the
Internet can still be considered a public forum not only for its open
and nondiscriminatory access, but also for its open and nondiscrimina-
tory content. As a society we are less likely to drive to the library to
do research, or attend a local meeting of a hobby group to seek out
others with mutual interests; increasingly, we are a society that clicks
on an Internet search engine to find the information we need, browses
websites, or converses in newsgroups with a diverse group of people
with mutual interests. Justice Kennedy agreed that there is a shift in
public discourse; therefore, narrowing the definition of a public forum"would have [a] pernicious [effect] ... in the modern age. Minds are
not changed in the streets and parks as they once were. To an
increasing degree, the more significant interchanges of ideas and
shaping of public consciousness occur in mass and electronic me-
dia.''" This is evident in the increasing number of "on-line"
versions of "paper" magazines and newspapers.
C. The Internet is Analogous to the Printing Press for
Free Speech Purposes
As we move into the twenty-first century, incidents will occur on
the Internet that will require the courts to either create brand new law
in a vacuum or to look for analogies in prior cases for guidance. We
conclude that the town meeting, as expressed in Dalzell's "worldwide
conversation," and the printing press, are the leading speech enhancing
analogies for the Internet. In order to decide which analogy is
superior, we should first examine the criteria for selecting an analogy.
First, the analogy, in accordance with Cardozo's "sociological method,"
should be consistent with Internet custom and usage, facilitating the
workings of the Internet and the benefits that its users expect to derive
from it. Second, it should further the dominant "marketplace of ideas"
metaphor for freedom of speech, and incorporate overarching speech
values tailored to the actual circumstances of the Internet. Third, the
analogy should be derived from history to promote familiarity and ease
of use in future decisionmaking. Finally, it should be simple,
expressive and easy to understand in order to facilitate its use by
laypeople, legislators, lawyers, and judges who are involved in Internet
free speech issues.
161. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2414 (citing United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 737 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)).
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Under these criteria, the Internet is more analogous to the printing
press than the town hall. The Internet, for free speech purposes,
should be regarded as a "constellation of printing presses and book-
stores. "1
62
Every computer attached to the Internet simultaneously utilizes its
capability to create text (acting as a printing press), distribute text
created by other people (acting as a bookstore) or store text (acting as
a library). Although pictures, animations, and sound files are also
speech, the primary use of the Internet today is to distribute and
receive text-e-mail messages, Usenet and listserv discussions,
electronic newsletters and other files. Use of the Internet, and of the
World Wide Web in particular, has created a new public interest in
literacy and a corresponding concern with such matters as typography,
layout, graphics and hypertext links.
Most commentators agree with Judge Dalzell that a major
importance of the World Wide Web is that it makes an international
audience available at minimal cost to amateur speakers. According to
a Cato Institute policy analysis, "computer networks, particularly the
Internet, offer the casual, noninstitutional user a unique new opportu-
nity to reach a wide audience for his or her speech . -"" This
leads to "a view [of] the significance of computer networks in the
marketplace of ideas ... through the lens of analogy. One could say
that computer networks have the power to transform the ordinary
person into a publisher, a broadcaster, a newspaper editor."' ' 4
Also, the printing press metaphor stresses the importance of free
speech. Both spirited discussions via on-line message boards and the
widespread availability of archived information on the Internet promote
not only literacy, but also the dissemination of individual ideas. The
power to set your thoughts and ideas to paper (or on-line text) and
distribute them is rewarding to human development and autonomy,
and therefore more supportive of liberty than the town hall, which
addresses political discourse.
Therefore, we reject the town hall and endorse the "constellation
of printing presses and bookstores" for two reasons. First, it is more
consistent with Holmes's "marketplace of ideas." Printing presses
supply bookstores, and bookstores are the marketplace of ideas. A
town hall analogy for the Internet would make sense only if the town
162. JONATHAN WALLACE & MARK MANGAN, SEX, LAWS AND CYBERSPACE 228 (1996).
163. SOLVEIG BERNSTEIN, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS No. 262: BEYOND THE
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF THE INTERNET 4 (1996).
164. Id. at 6.
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hall was the operative metaphor for freedom of speech itself. Second,
the town hall analogy is frequently used (as Sunstein uses it) to justify
government intervention in speech which does not directly advance the
interests of deliberative democracy. Ultimately, the town hall as a
model may lead to the Meiklejohnian ideal: that the First Amendment
is only intended to protect political speech. This ideal detracts from
First Amendment protections and is contrary to its historical jurispru-
dence.16 Therefore, because we believe that a broader range of
speech than the political is important, rewarding to human develop-
ment and autonomy, and supportive of liberty, we reject the town hall
analogy and endorse the "constellation of printing presses and book-
stores."
V. CONCLUSION
In the nineteenth century, faced with a confusing array of new
technologies, courts soon selected the correct analogy to resolve
doubtful legal issues: by comparing the telegraph to prior methods of
common carriage, and the telephone to the telegraph, they established
the correct legal treatment for each technology.
As the twenty-first century approaches, courts are once again
faced with a similar challenge and must accomplish the same mission
for the Internet. The selection of an analogy should be accomplished
with the operative freedom of speech metaphor-Justice Holmes'"marketplace of ideas"- in mind. The analogy selected should not
only resolve legal confusion about the Internet, but should further the
American marketplace of ideas.
The printing press, if selected as the correct analogy for the Net,
will further both these goals. It will establish the highest level of First
Amendment protection for the Net, while assuring the untrammeled
and unmediated competition of ideas in cyberspace.
Finally, a thought experiment: posit that before the end of the
next century, the quantity of text available electronically will be one
thousand times that which is available on paper. Adoption of the
printing press as the correct analogy for the Internet will ensure that
165. It is not even clear that the CDA would have been held unconstitutional under a town
hall metaphor. But see United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 223. The Court states:
[B]ut the First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly only to the extent it
can be characterized as political. Great secular causes, with small ones, are guarded.
The grievances for redress of which the right of petition was insured, and with it the
right of assembly, are not solely religious or political ones. And the rights of free speech
and a free press are not confined to any field of human interest.
19971
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electronic text and paper text are treated consistently.'66 A rule
which permits stricter regulation of electronic text will result in the full
protection of the First Amendment becoming an anomaly, merely a
historical survival for an ever-dwindling amount of speech.
The Internet and World Wide Web, although young, already
offer a rich tradition of conversation, advocacy, dreams, stories,
metaphor and debate. To preserve and foster the growth of this
inherently democratic medium, the Supreme Court should analogize
the Internet to a "constellation of printing presses and bookstores."
166. Laurence Tribe has said that
the Constitution's norms, at their deepest level, must be invariant under merely
technological transformations. Our constitutional law evolves through judicial
interpretation, case by case, in a process of reasoning by analogy from precedent. At
its best, that process is ideally suited to seeing beneath the surface and extracting deeper
principles from prior decisions.
As a result, he proposed a 27th amendment to the Constitution:
This Constitution's protections for the freedoms of speech, press, petition, and
assembly, and its protections against unreasonable searches and seizures and the
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, shall be construed
as fully applicable without regard to the technological method or medium through which
information content is generated, stored, altered, transmitted, or controlled.
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